Vail Resorts, Great Wolf, Club Med and Banyan Tree secured their revenue early. Baha Mar and Revel borrowed billions and ended up in bankruptcy court.
Resort Case Study Examples
Case 1
This resort case study looks at six resort businesses. Four found a way to sell the stay before the guest arrived, and two megaresorts borrowed billions against an opening that went wrong.
A resort is a heavy business to carry. The land, the buildings and the staff cost the same whether the rooms are full or empty, and demand moves with the weather, the season and the economy. Each of the four successes below solved that problem its own way: one sold the season in advance, one put the attraction under a roof, one moved its whole formula upmarket and one turned a plot nobody wanted into a brand. The two failures were both enormous projects funded largely with debt, and both ended in bankruptcy court. Taken together, the cases point away from the buildings. The resorts that lasted secured their revenue early and kept control of the day it started.
Case Study 1: Vail Resorts, the Ski Season Pass Business Model That Sold the Season Before the Snow Falls
Vail Resorts launched the Epic Pass in March 2008 at $579 for an adult season of unrestricted skiing. Thirteen years later it cut pass prices by 20% to sell even more of them, and in fiscal 2025 the company reported net revenue of $2,964.3 million from 42 resorts.
About the Business
Type: Mountain resort operator selling multi-resort season passes
Founded/Launched: Epic Pass introduced in March 2008; company based in Broomfield, Colorado
Revolution: Turned a ski holiday from a last-minute ticket purchase into a commitment made months before the season.
A ski resort carries lifts, snowmaking and seasonal staff whatever the weather does. A skier who buys day tickets decides late, often after checking the forecast, so a thin snow year empties the slopes and the accounts together. Revenue that arrives only on good days is hard to plan around and hard to borrow against.
Price for commitment: The original pass offered 17,400 acres of terrain, 128 chairlifts and 722 trails for $579. For the next season the company let guests lock in that price with a $49 down payment and pay the balance in September.
Cut the price to widen the base: For the 2021–22 season Vail cut pass prices by 20%, taking the Epic Pass to $783. Chief executive Rob Katz set a goal of having more than 75% of lift revenue come from passes.
Use the network and the data: The company describes owning 42 resorts with "direct access to guest data across all lines of business," which it uses to set marketing and pricing for tickets and passes.
The Results
Financial Metric/Exit: Fiscal 2025 net revenue of $2,964.3 million, up 2.7%, net income of $280.0 million and Resort Reported EBITDA of $844.1 million.
Scale/Impact: Lift revenue reached $1,503.2 million in fiscal 2025. Pass units are expected to be more than 50% higher in fiscal 2026 than in fiscal 2021.
Revolutionary Insight: Advance commitment moves the weather risk off the income statement.
A pass bought in spring is revenue the resort keeps whatever falls in January, which is why the 2021 price cut made sense. The model has a limit, and fiscal 2025 shows it: total skier visits fell 3%, and pass sales for the next season fell about 3% in units while rising about 1% in dollars, helped by a 7% price increase. Higher prices can hold revenue up for a while; they cannot replace guests who stop coming.
Case 2
Case Study 2: Great Wolf Resorts, the Indoor Water Park Resort That Ignores the Weather
In 1997 the original owners of a Wisconsin Dells water park opened a small indoor water park resort called Black Wolf Lodge. Each owner since has sold the business on at a higher value: a package worth $798 million in 2012, then a joint venture valued at $2.9 billion in 2019.
About the Business
Type: Family resort chain built around indoor water parks
Founded/Launched: May 1997, Lake Delton, Wisconsin, by brothers Jack and Andrew Waterman
Revolution: Put the water park under a roof, so a summer attraction could fill hotel rooms in every season.
An outdoor water park in a northern state has a short summer to earn its year. A wet weekend loses revenue that cannot be recovered, and the fixed costs keep running through the months when the slides are closed.
A climate the family can book: The indoor water park is kept at 84 degrees all year. The weather outside stops being part of the decision.
Everything on one site: Every lodge combines a full-service hotel, an indoor water park, game rooms, ropes courses, family bowling and themed experiences with characters unique to the brand. After a third location opened in 2003, all future parks went under the Great Wolf Lodge name.
Repeat the formula near cities: The chain now runs more than 20 lodges and tells families they are "only a short drive away." Seven new lodges opened between 2015 and 2019.
The Results
Financial Metric/Exit: Apollo's purchase was valued at $798 million in 2012; Centerbridge's purchase in 2015 was reported at $1.35 billion, about 70% more. In 2019 a new private equity investor bought a 65% controlling interest and formed a $2.9 billion joint venture with Centerbridge to own the company.
Scale/Impact: 18 resorts and about 6,000 full-time employees at the time of the 2019 deal, and more than 20 lodges today.
Revolutionary Insight: Removing the season made the business something buyers could value.
A water park that opens every day of the year produces steadier revenue than one waiting on sunshine, and three successive owners paid more for it. The figures are deal values rather than reported profits; none of the sources read gives Great Wolf's revenue. A founder planning a resort can apply the same test to their own valuation: how many weeks of the year does the business actually earn?
Case 3
Case Study 3: Club Med, the All-Inclusive Resort Chain That Moved Its Holiday Villages Upmarket
Club Med began in 1950 as a low-priced summer colony of tents on Mallorca. Fosun completed its takeover in February 2015 after France's longest-running takeover battle, at a valuation of €939 million, at a time when the company was expected to report a loss. In 2025 it recorded €2,222 million of business volume at an average daily rate of €241.
About the Business
Type: All-inclusive resort operator
Founded/Launched: 1950, by Belgian entrepreneur Gérard Blitz; his tent supplier, Gilbert Trigano, took control after Blitz went bankrupt in 1953
Revolution: Sold the whole holiday at one price, then rebuilt that formula for a wealthier guest.
A low-priced all-inclusive holiday competes on price with every package operator, and its margins depend on full occupancy. Club Med fell into a deep loss after the September 2001 attacks. More than a decade later its business was still described as damaged by a weak European economy and "a stalled attempt to move upmarket."
Close the basic villages: From 2002, chief executive Henri Giscard d'Estaing refocused on the holiday villages and on upmarket guests, closing many villages with more basic facilities; the company returned to profit in 2005.
A shareholder with a long view: Fosun's offer of €24.60 per share was the eighth Club Med investors had been asked to review since May 2013. Both bidders hoped to develop the brand in China.
Grow where prices hold: In 2025 mountain resorts grew close to 10% and the luxury Exclusive Collection 5%, and the daily rate rose 5%, which the company attributes to its premium positioning.
The Results
Financial Metric/Exit: Business volume of €2,222 million in 2025, up 4% at constant exchange rates, with operating margin up on the year.
Scale/Impact: More than 1.4 million clients, room occupancy of 75.8%, and 61 premium resorts in 25 countries. The stated target is 100 premium resorts and 2.6 million guests by 2035.
Revolutionary Insight: Fewer resorts at a higher price can be a bigger business.
In early 2015 Club Med owned 70 resorts in 26 countries and was expected to report a €12 million net loss on turnover of €1.38 billion. Ten years later it ran 61 resorts and took more than €2.2 billion. Turnover and business volume are not identical measures, so the comparison is indicative, but the direction is clear. Moving upmarket meant giving up guests who came for the low price.
Case 4
Case Study 4: Banyan Tree, the Pool Villa Resort Concept Built on a Tin Mine
In 1984 Ho Kwon Ping bought more than 550 acres at Bang Tao Bay in Phuket that turned out to be an abandoned tin mine. A decade later the last plot on the site, which had no beach and no operator willing to manage it, became the first Banyan Tree resort.
About the Business
Type: Resort, spa and branded residence group listed in Singapore
Founded/Launched: Laguna Phuket opened in 1987; Banyan Tree Phuket in 1994; listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange in 2006
Revolution: Made the private pool villa and the tropical spa its signature because the land offered no beach.
The land needed years of restoration before anything could be built on it. Other hotels on the site were handed to outside operators, but the final plot had no beach and, in Ho's words, "nobody wanted to manage it." A beach resort without a beach had no obvious buyer and no obvious guest.
Privacy in place of sand: Each villa got its own pool. "This was 30 years ago, so the notion of an 'all-pool villa' hotel didn't exist," Ho said.
The spa as a product: The flagship opened with the first Banyan Tree Spa. The group now runs more than 140 spas and galleries.
Own the brand, lighten the assets: The company describes an "asset-light growth model" and now operates 100 hotels and resorts and more than 20 branded residences in more than 20 countries.
The Results
Financial Metric/Exit: Revenue of S$477.4 million in 2025, up 25%, with core operating profit up 59% to S$109.8 million. Revenue in 2023 was about S$328 million.
Scale/Impact: The 100th resort, Mandai Rainforest Resort, opened in 2025, and 24 new agreements were signed. Residences revenue nearly doubled to S$197.6 million.
Revolutionary Insight: The weakness of the site became the selling point
A plot nobody would manage forced the company to create its own brand, and the pool villa it invented to replace a beach became the product. The 2025 growth came mainly from residences, which are sold once rather than booked every night, so the next test is whether room and fee income keeps pace.
Case 5
Case Study 5 (FAILED): Baha Mar, the Resort Bankruptcy Where the Building Could Not Open
In June 2015 the developer of a $3.5 billion Nassau megaresort filed for Chapter 11 in Delaware, after missing openings in December and March. The project included four hotels and more than 40 restaurants. It opened two years later under a new owner. A New York court later found the contractor had defrauded the developer, and the dispute was settled only in November 2025.
The Business
A hotel-and-casino megaresort in Nassau, in the Bahamas, developed by Sarkis Izmirlian's BML Properties.
The Peak/Capital
A $2.45 billion loan from China's Export-Import Bank, $150 million from the contractor, China Construction America (CCA), and $845 million from BML Properties.
The "Bitter Pill" Details
A contractor chosen by the lender: The developer's original partner left the project in 2008 as the recession hit. The replacement funding came with conditions: the bank stipulated that CCA must be the general contractor, with the right to bring in up to 8,000 Chinese construction workers. The developer had secured the money by giving up control over the party that set the completion date.
No revenue until the last day of building: "Unable to open, the resort has been left without a sufficient source of revenue to continue our existing business," Izmirlian said in a statement at the filing. The resort was said to be 97% complete at that point. A resort earns nothing until it opens, so the last 3% or so decided everything.
A bankruptcy in the wrong court: The developer filed in Delaware, but in October 2015 the Bahamas Supreme Court placed the resort in receivership and the Export-Import Bank took control. Construction then halted for more than a year.
The Financial Result
Chow Tai Fook Enterprises took over in December 2016 and planned to invest $200 million to open the resort. In 2019 a New York judge noted that BML Properties had lost "its entire investment in Baha Mar, or approximately $845 million." In October 2024 the trial court found that CCA had "knowingly and falsely" promised to meet deadlines, and in April 2025 an appeals court upheld $1.6 billion in damages. CCA blamed BML's own mismanagement for the losses. The parties settled in November 2025 on undisclosed terms, without any admission of liability.
Takeaway: Whoever controls the completion date controls the company.
Baha Mar had the capital and the design. What it did not have was control over construction, because the lender chose the contractor, and once the project failed, a Bahamian court rather than the Delaware one decided who would control it. Before signing a financing package, a developer should ask who decides when the building is finished, and what happens if that party has other priorities.
Case 6
Case Study 6 (FAILED): Revel, the Casino Resort Failure Built for a Guest Who Did Not Come
Revel opened on 2 April 2012 as Atlantic City's only smoke-free casino. It filed for bankruptcy less than a year later, filed again in June 2014, and was sold for $82 million, about 4 cents on the dollar of the $2.4 billion it cost to build.
The Business
A $2.4 billion casino resort in Atlantic City, New Jersey.
The “Bitter Pill” Details
Designed for the wrong customer: Revel's chief restructuring officer, Dennis Stogsdill, told the court the casino had "struggled mightily to make headway with the traditional Atlantic City patron that does not stay overnight." He also cited expensive food and drink, the lack of a players' club and marketing that was "not well-conceived and executed." The bankruptcy plan ended the smoke-free policy.
Losses that outlasted the restructuring: The first restructuring wiped out 82% of Revel's $1.5 billion of debt, leaving $272 million. It lost $110 million in the nine months it was open in 2012 and $130 million in 2013, a year that included the restructuring, and it was never profitable. A "You Can't Lose" promotion meant to win players back angered many of them instead.
A shrinking market: Atlantic City's casino revenue fell from $5.2 billion in 2006 to $2.86 billion in 2013, while competition grew from casinos in neighbouring states. The filing also cited a $100 million cost overrun blamed on a contractor and a six-day closure for Superstorm Sandy.
The Financial Result
Revel closed on 2 September 2014. Four earlier attempts to sell it fell through before Glenn Straub's $82 million purchase closed in April 2015. It was one of four of the city's 12 casinos to close in 2014, which together cost 8,000 jobs.
Takeaway: A resort has to be built for the guests the market actually has.
Revel aimed at overnight leisure guests in a city whose core customer was the day visitor, and then found its debt, its costs and its market were all moving against it. Its own restructuring officer admitted some of the wounds were "self-inflicted." Cutting 82% of the debt did not fix a resort designed for guests who were not coming. The first question in a resort plan is who the guest is and where they come from; the building comes after.