In jewelry, the brands that give customers a reason to return build lasting businesses, while those that expand too quickly or depend on borrowed money risk losing everything. Six jewelry case studies.
Jewelry Case Study Examples
Case 1
This jewelry case study looks at six businesses with very different outcomes. Four found ways to keep customers coming back. Two expanded their store networks but couldn't sustain the businesses behind them.
Jewelry isn't an easy product to build a company around. Most customers buy it only occasionally, precious metal prices are outside the retailer's control, and inventory is expensive to hold.
The four successful brands approached these challenges differently. Pandora made repeat purchases part of the product. Tiffany built a name customers were willing to pay more for. Brilliant Earth combined online shopping with physical showrooms, while Kendra Scott built customer relationships through its own stores.
The two failures tell another story. Alex and Ani expanded faster than its operations could support, while Samuels Jewelers depended heavily on a parent company whose financial troubles eventually brought the retailer down.
Together, these six cases show that success in jewelry depends on more than what sits in the display case. It depends on why customers return, how the business grows, and who controls the resources it needs to survive.
Case Study 1: Pandora, the DKK 32.5 Billion Charm Bracelet Business Model Built on a Bracelet That Is Never Finished
A necklace might be purchased once. A charm bracelet can bring customers back for every birthday, anniversary, and special occasion.
Pandora built a worldwide jewelry business around that difference. In 2025, it generated DKK 32.5 billion in revenue through a network of approximately 7,000 points of sale.
About the Business
Type: Vertically integrated branded jewelry manufacturer and retailer
Founded/Launched: 1982, Copenhagen, by goldsmith Per Enevoldsen and Winnie Liljeborg; charm bracelet concept launched in Denmark in 2000
Revolution: Turned jewelry from a single purchase into a collection the customer keeps adding to.
Affordable jewelry doesn't naturally create repeat customers. Someone buying a silver ring may love it, but that doesn't necessarily give them a reason to return to the same store.
At this price level, jewelry brands often compete on design and price. Customers have plenty of alternatives, and winning each new sale takes additional marketing.
Pandora needed something that would make customers return without having to convince them to buy an entirely new product every time.
A product designed for repeat purchase: Pandora introduced its charm bracelet concept in 2000. Instead of selling a finished piece, it offered something customers could keep adding to. Birthdays, anniversaries, and holidays became opportunities to purchase another charm.
Own the manufacturing: The company has manufactured jewelry in Thailand since 1989. Controlling production helped Pandora manage quality, costs, and supply rather than relying entirely on outside manufacturers.
Own the shop front: Pandora operates across more than 100 countries on six continents. Its approximately 7,000 points of sale include more than 2,800 dedicated concept stores. These stores give customers access to complete collections, rather than a limited selection displayed alongside competing brands.
The Results
Financial Metric/Exit: Pandora reported DKK 32,549 million in revenue in 2025, compared with DKK 31,680 million the previous year. Its EBIT margin reached 23.9%. The company has been listed on the Copenhagen stock exchange since 2010.
Scale/Impact: Organic growth reached 6% in 2025, including 2% like-for-like growth. This fell below the company's 7–8% guidance. Its EBIT margin also declined from 25.2% to 23.9%, despite measures taken to offset rising external costs.
Revolutionary Insight: The repeat purchase was designed into the product.
Most jewelry businesses spend money encouraging customers to return. Pandora created a product that gives customers a reason to do so.
But the model has weaknesses. A company selling large amounts of silver remains exposed to changes in metal prices.
In February 2026, Pandora pointed to surging silver costs and discussed introducing more platinum-plated jewelry to reduce that exposure.
The lesson is that repeat customers can support revenue, but they don't protect a business from rising production costs.
Case 2
Case Study 2: Tiffany & Co., the $15.8 Billion Jewelry Company Acquisition That Paid for a Name
Tiffany & Co. was founded in New York in 1837. Over nearly two centuries, it became one of the most recognizable names in luxury jewelry.
In January 2021, LVMH completed its acquisition of Tiffany for $15.8 billion, following a dispute over a deal originally valued at $16.2 billion.
The transaction showed just how much a jewelry brand can be worth beyond the gold and diamonds it sells.
About the Business
Type: Luxury jeweler, designer, manufacturer and retailer
Founded/Launched: 1837, New York City, by Charles Lewis Tiffany
Revolution: Made the brand, more than the stone, the thing the customer pays for.
Gold and diamonds are commodities. Two rings made from similar materials, with stones of comparable quality, may have nearly identical production costs.
If customers judge jewelry only by those materials, sellers have little choice but to compete on price.
Lab-grown diamonds have made this challenge more visible. Buyers can now compare stones with similar physical characteristics at very different prices.
For a luxury jeweler, the question becomes simple: why should someone pay more for your ring than another ring made from similar materials?
Design, make and sell under one name: Tiffany built its business around a recognizable identity that covered design, manufacturing, and retail. At the time of the acquisition, Tiffany and its subsidiaries employed more than 14,000 people.
Hold the price: Constant discounting can weaken a luxury brand because it teaches customers to wait for a lower price. Tiffany's reputation allowed it to sell jewelry based on design, experience, and brand recognition rather than competing solely on materials.
Sell to the right owner: Following the acquisition, LVMH appointed new leadership, including Anthony Ledru as chief executive and Alexandre Arnault as executive vice president for product and communications. Michael Burke was also named incoming chairman.
The Results
Financial Metric/Exit: LVMH completed the acquisition on January 7, 2021, paying $131.50 per share for a total transaction value of approximately $15.8 billion.
Scale/Impact: The original agreement, announced in 2019, valued Tiffany at approximately $16.2 billion, or $135 per share. After litigation in Delaware, the companies agreed to a lower price, reducing the transaction value by approximately $425 million. Tiffany shareholders approved the revised agreement on December 30, 2020.
Revolutionary Insight: In jewelry, the brand is the only asset that is not a commodity.
LVMH didn't spend $15.8 billion simply to acquire Tiffany's stores, inventory, and equipment. Much of the value came from the reputation Tiffany had built over generations.
Even after a legal dispute, LVMH remained willing to pay billions for that name.
A smaller jeweler can learn from the same principle. Two shops may buy diamonds from the same supplier, but the one customers trust more can justify a higher price.
Reputation takes years to build. Unlike inventory, competitors can't simply order it from a supplier.
Case 3
Case Study 3: Brilliant Earth, the Online Jewelry Business That Opened 40 Appointment Showrooms
Brilliant Earth began as an online jewelry retailer in San Francisco. But instead of remaining entirely online, it opened more than 40 physical showrooms.
That might seem unusual for a business built around digital sales.
Yet engagement rings are expensive, emotional purchases. Customers may enjoy researching them online while still wanting to see the final piece in person.
Brilliant Earth found a way to serve both preferences.
About the Business
Type: Digitally led fine jeweler with appointment showrooms
Founded/Launched: San Francisco; marked its twentieth anniversary in 2025
Revolution: Combined online selection with showrooms run by appointment.
Buying an engagement ring online is different from buying everyday clothing or accessories.
Customers want to examine the stone, understand its quality, and feel confident before spending thousands of dollars.
Traditional jewelry stores solve this problem with physical locations and large inventories, but maintaining those stores is expensive.
Online retailers avoid much of that expense, although they may struggle to convince customers to complete large purchases without seeing the product.
Brilliant Earth needed a way to offer personal reassurance without taking on the full cost of traditional retail.
Showrooms built around appointments: Instead of operating like traditional walk-in jewelry stores, Brilliant Earth developed an appointment-driven model. Customers can research products online and visit a showroom when they're ready to make a decision. The company planned another two or three showroom openings in 2025.
A values-led position: Brilliant Earth built part of its identity around responsible sourcing and environmental considerations. Its charitable initiatives also give certain customers another reason to choose the brand beyond price and design.
Grow beyond the ring: The company expanded its attention to fine jewelry, including pieces featuring lab-grown diamonds. In the fourth quarter of 2025, bookings for this category grew 61% year over year, while repeat orders increased 15%.
The Results
Financial Metric/Exit: Brilliant Earth reported net sales of $437.5 million in 2025 and adjusted EBITDA of $12 million.
Scale/Impact: Total orders rose 7% in the fourth quarter of 2025. However, average order value declined 2.3% during the quarter and 8.2% over the full year.
Revolutionary Insight: The showroom is there to close the sale.
Brilliant Earth didn't need every customer to walk into a physical store. It needed customers to visit when seeing the product could help them make a purchase.
The online store handles much of the browsing and selection, while appointments provide personal attention during the final decision.
By March 2025, Brilliant Earth had reported 14 consecutive profitable quarters as a public company.
Still, this model faces cost pressures. In the fourth quarter of 2025, its gross margin declined to 55.9% as precious metal prices increased.
The lesson is that physical stores can have a specific purpose in an online business. They don't have to replace digital shopping. They can support the moments when customers need extra confidence.
Case 4
Case Study 4: Kendra Scott, From $500 to $500 Million With a Designer Jewelry Store Business Model
Kendra Scott started her jewelry company in 2002 with just $500.
More than two decades later, the business had grown to approximately $500 million in annual revenue and operated 138 stores.
What began as a small design business became a national jewelry brand by building its own retail presence and connecting stores with local communities.
About the Business
Type: Fashion and fine jewelry brand with its own retail stores
Founded/Launched: 2002, by Kendra Scott
Revolution: Built a jewelry brand around its own stores and the events held in them.
Many independent jewelry designers start by selling through other retailers.
This makes it easier to reach customers without paying for a storefront. But the designer gives up a lot of control.
The retailer decides where products appear, how they're presented, and whether to reorder them.
More importantly, the retailer owns the customer relationship.
Opening your own stores changes that arrangement, but it also introduces rent, staffing, inventory, and operating costs.
For a growing jewelry brand, the challenge is deciding when owning the customer relationship is worth the additional investment.
Own the stores: Kendra Scott expanded its directly operated retail network to 138 stores. The company announced plans to reach approximately 200 locations within about three years, including at least 15 openings planned for 2024.
Use the stores as community space: Rather than treating stores only as places to buy jewelry, the company hosted local events and charitable activities. It organized more than 21,000 events in one year and has donated over $65 million to charitable causes.
Bring in outside capital without giving up control: Berkshire Partners acquired a significant minority stake in the business in a transaction that valued Kendra Scott at more than $1 billion. The arrangement brought investment capital into the company while leaving control with existing owners.
The Results
Financial Metric/Exit: The company generated approximately $500 million in annual revenue in 2023, representing growth of nearly 20% from the previous year.
Scale/Impact: Kendra Scott reached 138 stores and announced plans to expand to approximately 200. The business has continued operating under its founder's name for more than two decades.
Revolutionary Insight: Owning the store means owning the customer.
Wholesale distribution can help a small designer grow, but it leaves important decisions in someone else's hands.
Kendra Scott took a different approach by developing its own retail network.
That meant taking responsibility for rent, staff, and store operations. In return, the company controlled product presentation, pricing, events, and customer relationships.
Its stores became more than sales locations. They gave customers reasons to visit even when they weren't planning a major jewelry purchase.
For small jewelry brands, the lesson isn't necessarily to open dozens of stores. It's to understand the value of maintaining a direct relationship with customers.
Case 5
Case Study 5 (FAILED): Alex and Ani, the Jewelry Chain Overexpansion Where 100 Stores Outran the Company
Alex and Ani opened its first store in 2009. Within a few years, the company had expanded to more than 100 stores across the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico.
The brand became popular, and its rapid growth suggested that the business was doing exceptionally well.
But behind that expansion, the company's operations were struggling to keep up.
By June 2021, Alex and Ani had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.
The Business
A jewelry brand founded by Carolyn Rafaelian in 2004, with its first retail store opening in Newport, Rhode Island, in 2009.
The Peak/Capital
More than 100 stores across the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico following rapid expansion during the early 2010s.
The "Bitter Pill" Details
Systems that could not keep up: According to its restructuring officer, the company's existing infrastructure struggled to handle demand. Rapid store openings put pressure on planning, inventory management, and supplier relationships. The business expanded faster than the systems supporting it.
Leadership that kept changing: Management turnover disrupted important business relationships. In 2018, minority investor Lion Capital worked on a restructuring plan intended to prevent default on the company's credit obligations. Lion later increased its stake, and Carolyn Rafaelian stepped down as chief executive in 2019.
Stores in the wrong decade: Changes in shopping habits reduced traffic to traditional retail locations. The company had committed to a large network of physical stores just as more customers were moving online. Major landlords, including Simon Property Group and Brookfield Property Partners, were among its largest unsecured creditors, each owed more than $3 million.
The Financial Result
Alex and Ani filed for Chapter 11 in Delaware in June 2021, reporting estimated assets and liabilities between $100 million and $500 million each.
At the time of filing, the company had approximately 74 leases remaining, while about 25 stores had closed.
It entered into a restructuring agreement with debt and equity holders and began looking for a buyer.
The company also announced plans to strengthen its online and wholesale businesses while continuing operations during restructuring.
Takeaway: A product customers love does not build the company for you
Alex and Ani had strong demand and a recognizable brand. Those advantages weren't enough to support its rapid expansion.
The company needed systems, experienced management, and financial controls capable of handling a growing store network.
Instead, growth increased operating complexity, while changing consumer habits made its physical locations more expensive to maintain.
For entrepreneurs, the lesson is that opening more stores doesn't automatically mean building a stronger business.
Before expanding, the first location must have processes that can work repeatedly without relying on constant intervention.
Growth should follow the company's ability to support it, not move faster than that ability develops.
Case 6
Case Study 6 (FAILED): Samuels Jewelers, the 112-Store Jewelry Store Bankruptcy Brought Down by Its Owner
Samuels Jewelers had a history dating back to 1891.
By 2018, it operated approximately 120 stores and generated more than $100 million in annual sales.
Yet in February 2019, the company closed its remaining 112 locations.
The collapse followed financial troubles involving its parent company in India, showing how a retailer can be brought down by problems outside its own stores.
The Business
An Austin, Texas-based jewelry chain owned by India's Gitanjali Group, operating approximately 120 stores at the time of its bankruptcy filing.
The “Bitter Pill” Details
A parent that became the problem: In February 2018, India's Central Bureau of Investigation brought fraud allegations against Gitanjali Group and its managing director, Mehul Choksi, involving approximately $2 billion. Choksi has denied the allegations. The resulting financial and legal problems affected Samuels, which depended on Gitanjali for important parts of its business.
Supply and credit vanished together: When Samuels lost access to Gitanjali, it also lost a major inventory source. Other suppliers became reluctant to extend credit, making it increasingly difficult to keep stores stocked. The retailer brought in liquidation specialists to sell excess inventory while management searched for a partner or buyer.
Losses were already growing: Before the parent company's scandal, Samuels reported a $3.1 million loss on $119.4 million in sales. The following year, its operating loss grew to $14.9 million. Competition and declining performance had already weakened the company. The problems involving Gitanjali removed financial and operational support that Samuels depended on.
The Financial Result
Samuels filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in Delaware on August 7, 2018, reporting assets and liabilities exceeding $100 million.
The company tried to find a buyer, but no suitable transaction emerged.
Wells Fargo eventually made a credit bid for the remaining assets, and all 112 stores closed on February 25, 2019.
A court-appointed examiner later alleged that Samuels had been used in connection with fraudulent activities involving its parent company. The report also questioned transactions involving one of the retailer's largest suppliers. Choksi disputed the examiner's conclusions.
This was Samuels Jewelers' fourth bankruptcy.
Takeaway: Know who owns your supplier, your lender and your parent
Samuels depended heavily on Gitanjali for ownership, inventory, and financial support.
When the parent company's problems became serious, Samuels struggled to replace those relationships.
The retailer already had operating losses, but losing access to supply and credit made recovery even harder.
A business can survive a difficult year. It is much harder to survive when its financing, inventory supply, and ownership support all become uncertain at the same time.
For jewelry entrepreneurs, this is a reminder to examine supplier concentration, financing arrangements, and ownership risks before they become urgent problems.
A useful exercise is to list the suppliers, lenders, and other partners your business couldn't operate without for a month. Then ask how quickly you could replace each one.